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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
ROLLAND BURGESS and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Case No. 970404-CA
Respondents,
Priority No. 7
vs.
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL, JWR
CONSTRUCTION and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Petitioners.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLLAND BURGESS

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-130(2)(b), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1 -303(6), Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-801(7), Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (8)(a), and Utah Code Ann.
§63-46B-16 (1953, as amended.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue presented by this appeal
The only issue in this case is whether Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 empowers the
Industrial Commission to change and modify its prior findings and orders even after
the applicable statutes of limitations has run.

Standard of review
The appropriate standard of review this court must apply in resolving the issue
in this case is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski

v. Industrial

Commission

of Utah, 9 3 4 P.2d 1 1 6 9 , 1172 (Utah App. 1997)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes in resolving this case are set forth in full in the
Addendum to this Brief. Those Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-78,

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65(1), Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66 and Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-

67 (1953, as amended.) 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
This case involves a claim for workers compensation benefits filed by Mr.
Burgess. On March 2 5 , 1995 Mr. Burgess filed t w o Applications for Hearing w i t h the
Industrial Commission of Utah. 2 The first Application for Hearing was filed for injuries
he sustained by accident arising out of and during the course of his employment on
July 1 , 1990 while working for respondent Siaperas Sand & Gravel. (R. 1)
The second Application for Hearing was filed for injuries he sustained by
accident arising out of and during the course of his employment on August 18, 1994
while working for respondent JWR Construction. (R. 10)

1

All references In this brief are to the applicable codes as they were enumerated at the time of the
industrial accidents. The references are not to the currently applicable Utah Code.
2

Now known as the Labor Commission of Utah. To be consistent, and for purposes of clarity, with the
history of this case, all references in this brief will be to the Industrial Commission.
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All the parties filed Motions for Review of Judge Elicerio's November 2 2 , 1996
Order. (R. 2 9 7 - 3 1 0 and 311-31 5) The parties then filed their respective reply to the
other's motions. (R. 3 1 6 - 3 3 0 and 332-336)
Disposition by the Industrial Commission
The Industrial Commission of Utah entered its Order on Motions for Review on
June 9, 1997.

(R. 347-350) The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the

amendment of Mr. Burgess 7 Applications for Hearing. The Industrial Commission of
Utah did rule that the issues raised by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in its
Motion for Review were moot and that it was appropriate to dismiss Mr. Burgess'
amended Applications for Hearing. (R. 349-350)
Statement of Facts
1. Mr. Burgess sustained injuries by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment w i t h Siaperas Sand & Gravel on July 1, 1990.

This accident

occurred when Mr. Burgess fell approximately 28 feet at the construction site. (R. 1)
2. Mr. Burgess sustained additional injuries by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment with JWR Construction on August 18, 1994.

This

accident occurred while Mr. Burgess was lifting plywood forms. (R. 10)
3. The employers and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, the workers
compensation insurance carrier, have accepted liability for the payment of medical
expenses and certain disability compensation. (R. 2 9 1 , 347)
4.

In the answers to the Applications for Hearing filed by the Workers

Compensation Fund of Utah, on behalf of the employers, it was admitted that Mr.

4

Burgess did suffer the accidents as alleged in his Applications for Hearing.

The

Workers Compensation Fund of Utah did deny that Mr. Burgess was entitled to any
additional benefits. (R. 29-31 and 32-33)
5. The two Applications for Hearing were consolidated for hearing. That
hearing was scheduled before Judge Elicerio on August 28, 1996. (R. 291)
6.

Judge Elicerio approved a compensation hearing on October 28, 1996

which reflected the acceptance of liability by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah.
(R. 291-292)
7. At the conclusion of the August 28, 1996 hearing, which was treated by
Judge Elicerio as an attorney conference, Mr. Burgess filed his Motion to Amend his
pending Applications for Hearing to include future claims and to join the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund as a party. Mr. Burgess also filed a Motion to Continue without
date his claim for additional benefits. (R. 182-183, 185-186 and 292)
8. The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah filed its responses to Mr. Burgess'
motions. (R. 259-269)
9. Judge Elicerio entered her Order on Motion to Amend on November 22,
1996. (R. 291-296)
10. Judge Elicerio provided a detailed legal analysis of the issues raised by Mr.
Burgess' motions and the Workers Compensation Fund's response to those motions.
(R. 293-294) In her analysis, Judge Elicerio did acknowledge that there is confusion
based upon the decisions \x\Avisv. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992)

5

and Middlestadt

v. Industrial Commission,

852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). (R. 293-

294)
1 1 . Mr. Burgess filed his Motion for Review on December 2 0 , 1 996 contesting
Judge Elicerio's denial of his Motion to continue his claim for future benefits without
date. (R. 311-315)
12. The Workers Compensation Fund filed its response to Mr. Burgess' Motion
for Review. (R. 297-310)
13. The Industrial Commission of Utah entered its Order of Motions for Review
on June 9, 1997. (R. 341-345)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is not a case in which an injured worker is asking this court to allow the
Industrial Commission to change or circumvent any statute of limitations. This is not
a case in which an injured worker is begging this court to permit the Industrial
Commission to award him benefits without him satisfying the burden of proof required
before benefits may be awarded.
This is a case in which an injured worker, Mr. Burgess, is asking this court to
offer him the opportunity which the Utah Supreme Court gave to Mr. Stoker in Stoker
v. The Workers

Compensation

Fund, 889 P. 2d 409 (Utah

1994) to petition the

Industrial Commission to reopen and modify its prior award of benefits. Mr. Burgess'
request is that this court affirm the Industrial Commission's June 9, 1997 Order. By
affirming that Order, this court will merely follow the holding of the Utah Supreme
Court in the Stoker case.

6

The Workers' Compensation Act requires that an injured worker file an
Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission within six years from the date
of an industrial accident. Once such an application is filed, the Industrial Commission
has jurisdiction over the claim.

After jurisdiction is gained by the Industrial

Commission, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 empowers the Commission to change and
modify its prior findings and orders.
The ruling requested by Mr. Burgess will result in a clear decision that all the
parties can understand and follow. Such a ruling will require an injured worker to file
an Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission within six years from the
date of the industrial accident.

Once such an Application is filed, the Industrial

Commission will obtain jurisdiction over the claim. That Commission can then modify
its prior findings or orders even after the six year period has run. Such a ruling will
produce consistent results is all claims filed with the industrial Commission. If an
injured worker fails to file an Application for Hearing within the six year period, the
claim will be barred. The Industrial Commission will never acquire jurisdiction over
such an untimely filed claim and can never utilize Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 to
circumvent any of the pertinent statutes of limitations.
An injured worker who does file a timely application, may then petition the
Industrial Commission to reopen and modify its prior award after the six year period.
That injured worker will of course have to satisfy his burden of proof.
This simple rule will also advance the public policy and interest all the parties
by injured workers to try and return to work and not just rely upon benefits payable

7

under the Workers' Compensation Act. The injured workers will attempt to return to
work because they will know that if their injuries are so severe as to prevent them
from working they have the security of being able to pursue claims for benefits under
that Act even if more than six years have past since the date of their industrial
accident. This rule will serve the integrity of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
This court cannot forget that it was this court's decisions in Avis
Middlestadt

and

that forced Mr. Burgess to file his amended Applications for Hearing.

Those case stand for the proposition that if an injured worker knows or should have
known that his condition is not stable, he must file an Application for Hearing within
the appropriate time limits. Unlike the petitioners in those case, Mr. Burgess has filed
timely Applications for Hearing w i t h the Industrial Commission.
In this case, there is no doubt that Mr. Burgess' condition is not stable. The
petitioners have purchased an electrical stimulator for him to use to treat his injuries.
The petitioners have also recognized that Mr. Burgess will require ongoing medical
care to treat his injury. 3
This court should follow the most recent direction, and decision, of the Utah
Supreme Court. This court should not follow decision which is thirty-one years old
and dealt w i t h provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act that have been amended
and modified numerous times since the old case cited by the petitioners in their brief
was decided.

3

There Is dispute as to the type or kind of ongoing care necessary to allow Mr. Burgess to continue
to work. The parties are in agreement that it is in their best interest if he can continue to work. It is also
the desire of Mr. Burgess to continue to work.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OBVIOUS READING OF UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-78
DOES NOT OVERRIDE THE LIMITATION PERIODS
ESTABLISHED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-98. NOR DID
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S APPLICATION IN THIS
CASE OF §35-1-78 RESULT IN THE CIRCUMVENTION OR
TOLLING OF ANY LIMITATIONS PERIOD.
Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-78 (1953, as amended) empowers the Industrial

Commission w i t h continuing jurisdiction to modify or change its prior orders and
findings. The vesting of the Industrial Commission w i t h continuing jurisdiction has
been steadfastly preserved by the State Legislature as it has amended the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act. 4
When §35-1-78 is examined in the historical context of w h a t the underlying
purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is, the necessity of empowering the
Industrial Commission w i t h continuing jurisdiction becomes plain and simple to see.
In North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission,

58 Utah 4 8 6 , 2 0 0 P. 211 (1921),

the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act had to
be interpreted liberally to effectuate its "beneficent and humane objects."

The

Industrial Commission realized this when it entered its June 9, 1997 Order in this
case. (R. 347-350)

4

The petitioners in their brief, in appendix 2, have provided this court with the history of §35-1-78 from
1917 to the present. Each amendment to that section from 1917 to the present preserves the ongoing
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. That section also provides that the powers and jurisdiction of the
commission over each case shall be continuing.

9

The continuing jurisdiction

provision of

§35-1-78

allows the

Industrial

Commission to modify or change its orders. What the petitioners fail to recognize is
that before jurisdiction can be continuing, jurisdiction must be gained. In other words,
the Industrial Commission cannot extend or toll the applicable limitation periods by
simply citing §35-1-78. That section applies only if the Industrial Commission has
jurisdiction over a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Jurisdiction is gained
when an Application for Hearing is filed w i t h the Industrial Commission within the
applicable limitation periods contained in §35-1-98 or any of the other pertinent
statutes of limitations contained in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The threshold query is whether the Applications for Hearing filed by Mr.
Burgess were filed timely? If they were filed timely, then the Industrial Commission
is empowered by §35-1-78 w i t h continuing jurisdiction to modify or change its prior
findings and orders.
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act limits the type of damages an injured
workers may recover when injured while working. For example, an injured worker is
not compensated for all lost wages sustained due to an industrial injury, an injured
worker is not compensated for pain and suffering as a result of an industrial injury,
and an injured worker is not compensated for the loss of future earning capacity due
to an industrial injury. Realizing that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act denies an
injured worker the right to be fully compensated vis-a-vis a common law tort action,
the State Legislature has sought to partially remedy such inequity by allowing the
injured worker to assert entitlement to benefits beyond the limitation periods.

10

The

caveat to such an assertion is that the initial Application for Hearing must be filed
within the applicable limitation period.
In Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), this court was
called upon to determine whether a claim for benefits filed with the Industrial
Commission twenty-two years after the industrial accident was barred by §35-1-99.
After analyzing the issue, this court did rule that such a claim was barred. This court
did appreciate the fact that the petitioner in Avis knew "of the injury and could have
filed for compensation within the statutory period/' Id. at 588.
This court also ruled that the "workers' compensation statute, however, does
not require stabilization before filing/' Id. In other words, what that statute required
was a timely filing. This court then poignantly observed that in order to avoid a claim
from being barred based upon a statute of limitations defense is "to timely file." Id.
Mr. Burgess did just that. He filed his two Applications for Hearing with the Industrial
Commission in a timely manner.
In Middlestadt v. Industrial Commission, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993) this
court was confronted with the issues raised in the Avis case. This court affirmed its
Avis ruling when it issued its decision in the Middlestadt case. This court once again
ruled that if the petitioner knew that his condition was not stable "at the end of the
time period, he could have filed" for additional benefits "to allow for future loss of
earnings." Id. at 1014.
All the parties in this case know that Mr. Burgess' condition is not stable. That
is why Mr. Burgess has filed for additional benefits within the prescribed time limits.

11

Mr. Burgess does understand that the mere filing of an Application for Hearing does
not automatically entitle him to benefits. He still must present evidence to support his
claim for additional benefits.
In Stoker v. The Workers Compensation

Fund of Utah the appellant injured his

lower back in 1 982 while at work. The Industrial Commission awarded him benefits
in 1987.

In 1 9 9 1 , after undergoing more conservative medical treatment, the

appellant had back surgery.

He applied for additional benefits following the back

surgery. The Industrial Commission denied his Application for Hearing based upon the
eight year statute of limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the appellant in that case could "ask the
Commission

to reopen and modify its prior award if [he] can overcome

issues of causation

that exist."

Id. at 4 1 2

the

substantial

The Utah Supreme Court articulated and

recognized the principle Mr. Burgess is urging this court to affirm. That principle is
that once the Industrial Commission has gained jurisdiction, it can modify its prior
award even after the statute of limitations for the filing of a claim has run. This is a
simple rule, which is consistent with the prior decisions of this court as well as the
Utah Supreme Court. The clear articulation of this simple rule by this court will clarify
the obvious confusion of the Industrial Commission and preserve the integrity of the
Workers' Compensation Act.
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POINT II.
THE PETITIONER'S RELIANCE UPON UNITED STATES
SMEL TING, REFINING AND MINING COMPANY V. NIELSEN
IS MISPLACED.
The petitioners in their brief cite and rely upon United States Smelting, Refining
and Mining Company v. Nielsen, 430 P. 2d 162 (Utah 1967) to support their argument
that the Industrial Commission's June 9, 1997 Order should be reversed. In that case,
the applicant was injured in a mine cave-in 1952. The applicant received payments
pursuant to the then existing version of Utah Code Ann, §35-1-66 (1953) which
provided for the payment of benefits to an injured worker for upwards of six years
from the date of the injury. Id, at 162. The applicant then filed a claim for additional
benefits in 1965, approximately 13 years after the date of the accident. The court in
denying the applicant's claim for additional benefits relied upon the fact that he failed
to file his claim within the applicable three and six year statutes of limitations. Id, at
164
The petitioners in this case then cite in their brief the applicable section of the
Utah Code to persuade this court that the Industrial Commission erred when it entered
its June 9, 1997 Order. (Petitioners' brief at pg. 20-21)
The appropriate version of Utah Code Ann, §35-1-66 (permanent partial
disability benefits) does not contain a specific limitations period. Thus, this court must
look toward Utah Code Ann, §35-1-98 which merely requires that an Application for
Hearing is filed within six years after the date of the accident. Mr. Burgess filed just
such Applications on both of his compensable industrial accidents.

13

The applicable version of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (permanent total disability
benefits) also does not include a specific limitations period. Again, this court must
then turn to Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-98 which mandates that an Application for

Hearing be filed within six years from the date of the accident.
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -65(1) (temporary total disability benefits) is also
devoid of a specific filing period. That section ostensibly contains a time limit within
which such benefits may be payable. Once again, this court must turn to the six year
filing limitation imposed by Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-98.

The inescapable, and only, conclusion this court can reach is that Mr. Burgess
has complied w i t h all limitation periods that effect his claim for additional benefits
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act by filing his Applications for Hearing
within six years from the dates of his t w o compensable industrial accidents. More
importantly, Mr. Burgess has satisfied what the Utah Supreme Court in its recent,
unanimous decision held in Stoker v. The Worker Compensation

Fund of Utah, 889

P.2dat412.
In Stoker the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"[that] it would be ironic for [the Workers' Compensation]
Act to be construed in such a fashion that a worker w h o
undertakes a conservative course of therapy within time
allowed by the statute, which if effective would save the
Fund money and be less risky to the worker, would be
denied benefits when that course proves ineffective and a
more aggressive therapy must be pursued, resulting in
temporary total disability that occurs outside the eight-year
period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken
at the time of the less aggressive therapy, Stoker would
have met the requirements for additional total disability
benefits." Id.
14

It would be distressing if this court failed to recognize just how ironic it is to bar
Mr. Burgess' claims for future benefits because he is continuing to work with his
injuries. It should be noted that the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in the Stoker
case admitted, for purposes of its brief filed in that case, that if Mr. Stoker
experienced a period of temporary total disability more than eight years after his
industrial accident, he should be put to his burden of proof before the Industrial
Commission to prove that his ongoing health problems are reasonably related to his
industrial accident. Id.
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, in its brief filed in the Stoker case,
apparently acknowledge the Industrial Commission's power to modify prior awards
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78. It was after citing the Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah's brief, that the Utah Supreme Court ruled:
"[that] Stoker may ask the Commission to reopen and
modify its prior award if [he] can overcome the substantial
issue of causation that exist."
Mr. Burgess is just asking for the same opportunity accorded to Mr. Stoker by
the Utah Supreme Court. Mr. Burgess is not asking this court to overrule any statute
of limitations and he is not asking this court to relieve him from having to meet his
burden of proof. Mr. Burgess is asking this court for the opportunity to present his
claim for additional benefits to the Industrial Commission if his effort to continue
working with his injuries becomes to much for him and he needs the relief guaranteed
him by the Workers' Compensation Act.

15

CONCLUSION
Mr. Burgess respectfully prays that this court affirm the June 9, 1997 Order on
Motions for Review. By affirming that Order, this court will also affirm the social and
legal intent underlying the Workers' Compensation Act. That intent is to insure that
injured workers and their families will not be abandoned and denied the benefits
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act by uncaring employers and insurance
carriers.
Dated this 30th day of January 1998.
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I hereby certify that on this 30th day of January 1998 I delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Mr. Burgess to the following:
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160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
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Attorney for Labor Commission

Barbara W. Sharp
392 East 6400 South
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James R. Black
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioners
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160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
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Dated this 30th day of January 1998
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-98 (1990)

[Effective May 9, 1967-April 22, 1990.]
*1990 Repeal and Reenactment*
Section 35-1-98 was repealed in 1990 and reenacted to read as follows:
35-1-98. Claims and benefits.
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably
related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years.
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is barred,
unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission within six years after the date of
the accident.
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed within one year of
the date of death of the employee.
[Effective April 23, 1990-present.]
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ADDENDUM NO. 2

UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-78 (1990)

35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to formerfindings,or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified.
[Effective 1917-May 8, 1961.]
*1961 Amendment*
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to formerfindings,or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability, which have been closed and inactive for a period of 10
years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
[Effective May 9, 1961-June30, 1963.]
*1963 Amendment*
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to formerfindings,or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
[Effective July 1, 1963-June30, 1965.]
*1965 Amendment*
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify — Authority to destroy records.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
[Effective July 1, 1965-May 11, 1981.]
*1981 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy

records — Interest on award.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
Awards made by the industrial commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988.]
* 1988 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit pavment would have otherwise become due and pavable.
(3)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Compensation Act.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in
Subsection (a) in any respect.
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990.]
* 1990 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
(3)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Law.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in
Subsection (a) in any respect
[Effective April 23, 1990-May 1, 1994 ]
*1994 Amendment*

35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award - Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable
(3)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in
Subsection (3)(a) in any respect.
[Effective May 2, 1994-April 30, 1995.]
* 1995 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records - Interest on award - No authority to change statutes of limitation Authority to approve final settlement claims.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders.
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases
of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3) Awards made by the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the
date when each benefit pavment would have otherwise become due and payable
(4)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in
Subsection (4)(a) in any respect.
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 35-1-90, the commission shall review and may
approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final:
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under
Chapters 1 and 2;
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit
entitlements under Chapters 1 and 2 by means of a lump sum payment, structured
settlement, or other appropriate payout.
[Effective May 1, 1995-present.]
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STOKER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
889 P 2d. 409 (Utah 1994)
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Kyle STOKER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
The WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH and the Industrial Commission for the State of Utah, Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 920386.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 2. 1994.
Rehearing Denied Feb. S, 1995.

due process provision of State Constitution
and constituted unconstitutional cap on damages were waived, where claimant failed to
present these claims to the trial court.
Const. Art. 1, § 7; U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65(1).
3. Workers' Compensation C=>2, 6
Workers' Compensation Act is comprehensive statutory scheme that provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in
course of their employment, irrespective of
fault, in lieu of common-law tort actions.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq.
4. Workers' Compensation 0=1003

Workers' compensation claimant who
was denied additional temporary total disability benefits hased on statutory eight-year
time limitation on such benefits brought action seeding determination that temporary
total disability statute was unconstitutional.
The Second District Coun. Weber County,
David E. Roth. J., ruled that statute was
constitutional, and claimant appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewan. Associate C.J.. held
that statutory eight-year period did not operate as a statute of repose with respect to
claimant who asserted claim for temporary
total disability benefits and lost right to file a
second time for benefits as result of his
choice of the type of treatment he wanted to
undertake within the limited time left under
the statute.
Affirmed.
Zimmerman, C.J., concurred in result.
1. Workers' Compensation c=»S39, 842
Under workers' compensation statute,
ten\pwar>- \.o\a& &yabi\i\\* benefit* are subject to three limitations: they are payable
only for a maximum of 312 weeks at rate of
100% of the state average weekly wage and
benefits must be paid within eight years of
the date of injury, even if they have been
paid to injured worker for less than 312
weeks when eight-year period expires.
U.C.A.1953. 35-1-65(1).
*• Workers' Compensation C=>1846
Claims on appeal that eight-year period
•« temporary- total disability statute violated

Temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent
partial and permanent total disability benefits, medical expenses for injured employees,
-anti oVner certain benefits Tmuer NNurkeTs'
Compensation Act, whether \iewed individually or together, are not analogous to an
ordinary lump-sum judgment that the common law provides for personal injury actions;
not only may benefits under Act be paid over
period of time rather than in lump-sum judgment, but award of benefits does not generally have the res judicata effect of a judgment.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65. 35-1-65.1, 35-1-81.
5. Workers' Compensation o=>26
Since statutory provisions were not facially unconstitutional. Supreme Court would
presume that 312-week limitation and eightyear limitation on temporary total disability
benefits under Workers' Compensation Act
were constitutional, although it was not clear
why legislature imposed them. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-65(1).
6. Constitutional Law e=>48(l)
It is burden of one attacking constitutionality of statutory provision to demonstrate that provision is unconstitutional.
7. Limitation of Actions c=>165
Whether statute that bars or terminates
claim for relief is statute of limitations or
statute of repose depends on nature of the
statute and manner in which it operates to
cut off legal right of person to obtain remedy
for an injury.
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8. Workers' Compensation <3=>839
Eight-year limitation in workers' compensation statute stating that temporary total disability compensation benefits shall not
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of state
average weekly wage at time of the injury
over period of eight years from date of the
injury did not operate as a statute of repose
in the case of a claimant who asserted claim
for temporary total disability benefits and
lost the right to file a second time for temporary total disability benefits as a result of his
choice of the type of treatment he wanted to
undertake within the limited time left under
the statute: eight-year statutory limitation
barred claimant's remedy because of the
choice he made. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65(1).
9. Workers' Compensation <2>1795
Workers' compensation claimant who
undertook consen'ative course of therapy
within time allowed by temporary total disability statute and who then pursued more
aggressive course of treatment which resulted in temporary total disability outside the
eight-year statutory period could ask Industrial Commission to reopen and modify its
prior award if claimant could overcome the
substantial issues of causation that existed.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65(1).
Martin W. Custen. James R. Hasenyager.
Patrick F. Holden. Ogden. for plaintiff.
Dennis V. Lloyd, James R. Black, Salt
Lake City, for defendants.
STEWART. Associate Chief Justice:
Kyle Stoker tiled a complaint in the district court seeking a ruling that Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-65(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") is unconstitutional under
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution
insofar as it provides that no temporary total
disability benefits may be paid after eight
years from the time of an injury-causing
accident. The district court held the provision constitutional, and Stoker appeals.
Stoker injured his lower back on October
13, 1982, and again on November 15, 1982.
while working for a construction company as
a laborer. His back condition deteriorated.

and surgery was performed on January 13,
1987. The Industrial Commission awarded
Stoker temporary total disability benefits in
the amount of $4,788.76 for an approximately
22-week period from December 24. 1986,
through May 24, 1987. The Commission also
awarded Stoker partial disability benefits in
the amount of $6,627.85, medical expenses,
and attorney fees.
After his surgery. Stoker's back condition
continued to deteriorate. In May 1990. less
than eight years from the date of his injury.
Stoker's treating physician advised the
Workers' Compensation Fund ("Fund"' that
because of chronic unrelenting pain. Stoker
should be evaluated for spinal fusion surgery.
However, Stoker and his doctor decided first
to try the more consen'ative treatment provided by a pain clinic program to try :.j avoid
surgery. The Fund authorized and paid for
that therapy, but it was unsuccessful In
January 1991, Stoker underwent a spinal fusion.
[1] Stoker applied for additional :emporary total disability benefits for the period
relating to the second surgery. The Commission denied the application based on the
eight-year time limitation on temporary total
disability benefits in Utah Code Ann. $ 351-65(1). In pertinent pan. that section
states: "In no case shall such [temporary
total disability] compensation benefits exceed
312 weeks at the rate of lOO'r of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the
injury orer a period of enjht years fnun the
date of the injury." (Emphasis added.) Under this provision, temporary total <usability
benefits are subject to three limitations: (1)
they are payable only for a maximum of 312
weeks, (2) at a rate of LOOCr of the state
average weekly wage, and (3) the benefits
must be paid within eight years of the date of
the injury, even if they have been paid to an
injured worker for less than 312 weeks when
the eight-year period expires.
Stoker argues that the eight-year period
violates the Due Process and Open Courts
provisions in Article 1. Sections 7 and 11.
respectively, of the Utah Constitution because the limitation is an unconstitutional
statute of repose under Berry r. Btech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah l^o), and
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Wrolstad v. Industrial
Commission, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 795
P.2d li:fr (Utah 1990), or an unconstitutional
cap on damages under the ruling in Condcmurin r. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348
(Utah 1989).
The Fund argues that the eight-year provision is neither a statute of limitations nor a
statute of repose because it does not totally
bar compensation. Rather, the Fund argues,
the provision limits only the total amount of
temporan- total disability benefits and the
time within which an injured worker can
receive such benefits, whether the benefits
claimed are the total allowable or less than
the total allowable. The Fund also states
that such benefits are pan of an airay of
remedies provided by the Act, some of which
can continue indefinitely. Sec Kcnnecott
Copper Cor}), v. Industrial Comm'n. 597 P.2d
875, 877 (Utah 1979): se( also Utah Code
Ann. S 35-1-99.2) (1988).
[2] Because Stoker failed to present to
the tiial coun his due process claim and the
claim that the limitations in § 35-1-tf5(1)
constitute an unconstitutional cap on damages, we decline to address those claims.
We therefore address only the claim that
§ 35-1-65(1) is an unconstitutional statute of
repose.
[3,4] The Workers' Compensation Act is
a comprehensive statutory scheme that provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law tort
actions. The Act provides temporary total
disability benefits, $ 35-1-65; temporary
partial disability benefits, § 35-1-65.1; permanent panial and permanent total disability
benefits, § 35-1-81; and medical expenses
for injured employees, § 35-1-81. as well as
certain other benefits.
These remedies,
whether \iewed individually or together, are
not analogous to an ordinary lump-sum judgment that the common law provides for personal injury actions. Not only may benefits
be paid over a period of time rather than in a
lump-sum judgment, but an award of benefits
*• See also Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d
537 (Utah Ct.App. 1993); Wrolstad v. Industrial

does not generally have the res judicata effect of a judgment.
[5,6] While it is not clear why the Legislature imposed both a 312-week limitation
and an eight-year limitation on temporary
total disability benefits, we presume that
those provisions are constitutional. Lee v.
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572. 580 (Utah 1993);
Be union v. ANR Prod. Co.. 819 P.2d 343, 345
(Utah 1991); Greenwood r. City of N. Salt
Lake, 817 P.2d 816. 819 (Utah 1991). They
clearly are not facially unconstitutional under
Berry and its progeny. It is the burden of
one attacking the constitutionality of a statutory provision to demonstrate that the provision is unconstitutional.
[7] Whether a statute that bars or terminates a claim for relief is a stature of limitations or a statute of repose depends on the
nature of the statute and the manner in
which it operates to cut off the legal right of
a person to obtain a remedy for an injury.
Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 575-76; sa also Berry.
717 P.2d at 672; Dan sic v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 115^-59 (Utah Ct.
App.1994); Hales v. Industrial Comm'n. 854
P.2d 537. 539 (Utah Ct.App.1993, Although
$ 35-1-65 might act to cut off a claim a
worker may have for temporary total disability benefits and possibly raise a constitutional issue under Berry, ] that is not the case
here.
[8] In this case, § 35-1-65 did not operate as a statute of repose. The eight-year
bar did not preclude Stoker from assening a
claim for temporan- total disability benefits.
In fact, he did assen a claim. He received
such benefits from December 24, 1986,
through May 24. 1987. He couid even have
received a second award of such benefits for
temporan' total disability resulting from surgery for a condition causally connected to his
industrial accident if he had known of the
necessity for additional medical treatment
and had undergone the surgery prior to the
expiration of the eight-year period.
Stoker must have known that a spinal fusion would result in a period of temporary
Comm'n, 786 P.Zci 243 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
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total disability. He lost the right to file a
second time for temporary total disability
benefits as a result of his choice of the type
of treatment he wanted to undertake within
the limited time left under the statute. The
eight-year limitation barred his remedy because of the choice he made. That kind of
bar does not operate as a statute of repose
under Bemj and its progeny. See Ganfin,
S67 P.2d at 576.
[9] Nevertheless. Stoker may still have a
remedy under the Act. It would be ironic
for the Act to be construed in such a fashion
that a worker who undeitakes a conservative
course of therapy within the time allowed by
the statute, which if effective would save the
Fund money and be less risky to the worker,
would be denied benefits when that course
proves ineffective and a more aggressive
therapy must then be pursued, resulting in
temporary total disability that occurs outside
the eight-year period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undeitaken at the time of
the less aggressive therapy. Stoker would
have met the requirements for additional total disability benefits.
The Industrial Commission and the Fund
both seem to recognize as much in their
brief. They state:
For the purposes of WCFs Brief and for
that purpose only WCF concedes the plaintiff experienced a period of temporary total
disability related to his industrial accident
of October 13. 1982, while employed by Big
D Construction Company more than eight
years after his industrial accident. Plaintiff should be put to his burden of proof
before the Industrial Commission of Utah
to prove that any continuing problem is
reasonably related to his industrial accident.
The brief then states, "The Commission has
continuing jurisdiction to modify its prior
award herein pursuant to Section 35-1-78
U.C.A." -' Section 35-l-78(3)(b) provides,
however, that "[t]he commission has no power to change the [applicable] statutes of limitations.** In short, Stoker may ask the Commission to reopen and modify its prior award
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) provides in pan:
'The powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing. The commis-

if Stoker can overcome the substantial issues
of causation that exist.
Affirmed.
HOWE and DURHAM. JJ.. and ORME,
Court of Appeals Judge, concur.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J.. concurs in the result
ORME, Court of Appeals Judge, sat to fill
the vacancy on the Court.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.

Jason Alan LOWDER, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 930412.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 16. 1994.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 16. 1995.
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
District Court, Washington County, James L.
Shumate, J., of aggravated sexual abuse of a
child. Defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham. J., held that: (!) sexual
abuse statute prohibited nonsexual assault
directed to sexual pans of child's body; (2)
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) denial of defendant's morion
to enter conviction of lesser offense of misdemeanor child abuse was proper.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law C=>1134<3)
Interpretation of statute is question of
law, which Supreme Court reviews for correctness.
sion. after notice and hearing, may from tfli>c
time modify or change its prior findings a 00
orders."

